“To Whose Benefits?” An Analysis of ECFA’s Domestic Distributive Effects From A Comparative Perspective

本研究欲從自由貿易的分配影響、中國區域貿易之策略以及中國商業合作的特殊主義（Particularism），為ECFA之分配性效果提供政治經濟的結構分析。 第一部分的分析角度為自由貿易的理論與實務。傳統國際貿易理論以Smith和Ricardo的比較優勢原則為基礎，延伸的HO-SS 模型說明自由貿易帶來總體收益提升的同時，依然有分配不均的現象。新貿易理論則是進一步解讀不完全的市場競爭下資訊不對稱和交易成本之特質，面對市場的外部性，國家實際上長期具有貿易策略並對市場進行管制。自由貿易的分配效果以簽訂二十年之NAFTA作為實務經驗討論，可以發現自由貿易協定本身普遍對掌握生產要素之資本家或財團有利、各國非技術勞工則有普遍薪資下降和失業率上升的問題，並容易造成國內分配不均的現象。 第二個分析角度則是中國區域貿易策略的影響。中國改革開放後加入區域自由貿易的浪潮，透過與東亞地區的經濟體簽訂自由貿易協定，成為東亞區域經濟最重要成員之一。中國與東協共同簽署的多項戰略夥伴關係聲明，從自由貿易協定進一步達成區域性的戰略安全合作，改變中國在東亞地區的國際政經體系扮演的角色，在東亞區域儼然成為與美國相抗衡的政治經濟強權。以中港簽定的CEPA為例，中國簽定區域貿易協定有其經濟效益與國際安全之考量，並有著以經促統、建立大中華共同經濟圈之目的。 最後以上述兩個自由貿易案例經驗作為基礎，進一步分析1990年代以來兩岸貿易成長所帶來的分配效果─明顯的薪資兩極化趨勢。檢視2011年簽訂ECFA後的分配效果，也可發現資本家和技術勞工的獲益大於非技術勞工。從政治結構的角度分析ECFA，也可以發現中國的特殊主義做法和臺灣的裙帶資本主義（crony capitalism）導致兩岸買辦的形成。以台灣水果和虱目魚外銷的案例可得知，兩岸政府推動的經貿合作項目有時並未考量市場需求，而是中國欲透過特殊讓利的作法，取得特定的政治利益；而進行政策磋商的買辦則是了解中國讓利需要樣板，並透過特殊合作關係營利。This thesis gives a political-economic structurural analysis of ECFA’s distributive effects by studying the distributitive impacts of free trade, regional trade strategies of China and Chinese particularist business model. First, HO-SS model explains that when free trade brings overall profits, it usually causes income inequality as well. New trade theory further explains that there is externality of the real market like information asymmetry and transaction cost in the imperfect competition, and the nations tend to have trade strategies and regulate the market. The experience of NAFTA shows that free trade has caused income inequality. People with more factors of production gains from the free trade the most. Unskilled workers, on the other hand, suffer from lower income and higher unemployment rate. Reginal trade strategies of China are the second analytic perspective of this study. After The Chinese Economic Reform, China has joined several regional trade agreements. Through signing agreements with East-Asian countries, China has become one of the most important members in East-Asian economy. All the joint declarations of strategic partnership China has signed with ASEAN countries change China’s role in East-Asian security, and make China the other political economic power to compete with the United States in East Asia. CEPA which China signed with Hong Kong is an example of achieving the goal of economically and politically unity of China, by constructing the Great China economic formation with the the economic profits CEPA could bring. Finally, based on the finding of NAFTA and CEPA, this paper explores the distributive effects and income inequality of growing cross-strait trades in Taiwan since 1990s. After EFCA has been signed, the income inequality between bourgeoisie and unskilled workers has enlarged evidently. This distributive inequality phenomenon is caused mainly by the particularism of China and the crony capitalism in Taiwan, and the combining political structure creates the specific “brokers” who monopolize the benefits of ECFA. Taking exportation of fruit and Milkfish (Chanos chanos) for example, Chinese government has offered great profits to Taiwan’s “brokers” to achieve goal of political unity; meanwhile, these “brokers” gain most of this benefits from particularism compared with other Taiwanese who mostly gain little from ECFA